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Abstract  
 
Malware is  becoming  a  major  problem  to  every  organization  that  operates on  the  global 
communication platform. The malicious software programs are advancing in sophistication in 
many ways in order to defeat harden deployed defenses. When an organization’s defense fails 
to keep this malice invasion out, the organization would incur significant amount of risks and 
damages.  Risks  include  data  leakage,  inability  to  operate  and  tarnished  corporate  image. 
Damages include compensation costs to customers and partners, service unavailability and 
loss of customers’ and partners’ confidence in the organization. This in turn will affect the 
organization’s business continuity. In order to manage the risks and damages induced by 
Malware incidents, incident responders are called upon to be the last line of defense against 
the digital onslaught assault. However incident responders are challenged too by the deep 
levels  of  knowledge,  skills  and  experience  required  to  contain  the  ever  advancing  and 
persistent Malware. This paper proposes the establishment of a Pattern template for Malware 
Remediation to aid incident responders to overcome their competency limitations in order to 
provide organizations the tool to repel Malware and to reduce the associated risks. Examples 
and details of the proposed patters are provided with discussions on future direction of the 
research work. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Malware is a significant threat to organizations and individuals. The Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has already acknowledged the risks and 
threats imposed by Malware in their 2007 report [1]. Besides being a threat, Malware inflicts 
the consumption of additional resources and cost to fend off this malice. The consumption is 
still rising [2]. While organizations’ expenses are increased to build  defenses against this 
malice, some highly sophisticated Malware are still able to render the defenses ineffective. 
There are two main reasons to this. First is the ever advancement of Malware’s sophistication 
is causing the defense solution vendors to take a catch up or reactive posture in the battlefront. 
Secondly, human is the primary cause to the defense solutions inability to keep the malice at 
bay due to ignorance or omission [25]. Hence, Malware has proven to have the upper hand in 
its ability to penetrate and defeat these defenses.  
The  primary  effect  of  a  Malware  penetration  into  an  organizations’  Information 
Technology (IT) environment is the lost of control over IT assets by the affected organization. 
The following table illustrates the qualitative impact to an organization that loses control of its 
IT assets to Malware.  
 
Security Risks  Organization having More Control  Malware having More Control 
Confidentiality  Reduces  data  leakage,  protects 
confidentiality  
Increases  data  leakage,  losses 
confidentiality 
Integrity  Improves security posture, improves 
reliability of IT assets 
Degrades  security  posture, 
degrades reliability of IT assets   2 
Availability  Improves  resiliency,  enhances 
business continuity 
Degrades  resiliency,  affects 
business continuity 
Table 1. Security Risks Of Malware Control To Organizations. 
 
When a Malware takes control of an organization's IT assets, the organization has to 
respond  and  remediate  the  effects  and  risks  induced  by  the  Malware  promptly.  Such 
responsive actions may be carried out by formally or ad-hocly established incident response 
team.  Their  objective  is  to  restore  control  of  IT  assets  back  to  the  organization  through 
Malware remediation or containment. However, these incident responders face a number of 
challenges  in  their  battle  to  restore  control.  A  key  challenge  is  the  deep  competency 
(knowledge,  skills  and  experience)  requirements  over  the  incident  responders,  and  their 
ability  to  keep  pace  with  the  ever-advancing  Malware  technologies  and  contemporary 
weaponry used in the skirmishes between attackers and defenders.  
The lack of such competencies will result in delay and having a response plan that is 
limited or ineffective in remediating the Malware incident. This will in turn induces greater 
risks to the organizations. Incident responders therefore urgently require assistance to help 
them to overcome the limitations and to enable them to achieve the objectives to defunct the 
Malware and restore control of IT assets back to the organizations. This paper will cover the 
details of this challenge faced by incident responders. This is followed by a survey of the 
related research work reported previously on addressing this problem. Next, a proposal based 
on Malware Remediation pattern template is discussed in order to aid incident responders to 
deal with the abovementioned challenges. This is subsequently followed by two examples of 
Malware  Remediation  techniques  mapped  to  the  proposed  Malware  Remediation  pattern 
template. Finally, a conclusion and a list of future research options are given.  
 
II.  NEED TO RE-ENFORCE NEW DEFENCE LINE 
 
When a Malware successfully gets past deployed defenses and infects an organization’s 
or individual’s computing host(s), Malware Remediation becomes the new line of defense. 
However the new defense line, manned by incident responders, is under immense pressure 
with its deep competency requirements in order to match the evasive and complex Malware. 
 
A.  Challenges from Malware 
 
The Malware adversary is advancing in its ability to carry out its malicious mission. They 
can evade detection and persistently remain active as long as intended and they are able to 
fend off any attempts to eradicate them. Malware developers have incorporated many features 
to enhance their products’ evasive capability. They have embedded stealth capabilities into 
their products through various forms of obfuscation and abusive use of legitimate services. 
They have incorporated artificial intelligence [2] to adapt their Malware to the environment in 
order to camouflage their Malware from being detected and eradicated.  
Malware  developers  are  also  increasingly  incorporating  advanced  techniques  used  in 
software  resilience  designs.  Design  techniques  like  configuration  redundancy,  active 
monitoring  of the configuration, regular  updates  to enhance  software resiliency  and  deep 
entrenchment  into  the  core  of  the  operating  system.  With  such  resiliency  designs,  the 
Malware is capable of surviving attempts to defunct or eradicate it. 
Malware developers are also incorporating abilities to circumvent all forms of deployed 
defenses  like  Anti-virus,  Firewall  and  Intrusion  Detection  or  Prevention  systems  [4].  In 
addition, these defenses are now becoming victims of Malware self-preservation attacks [5]. 
Modern Malware can defunct the operational effectiveness of these defenses to remove the 
intended protection deployed to protect against loss of control over IT assets [6]. Malware 
developers  are  also  incorporating  mechanisms,  like  disabling  specific  operating  system 
services or regular product updates, to prevent attempts by incident responders or forensic 
investigators  to  conduct  containment  or  analysis  [7].  Anti-forensic  mechanisms  like 
encryption capabilities are frequently used in the designs of Malware [8].    3 
In recent times, there is an increasing number of Malware that are uniquely developed to 
target specific individuals and organizations [9]. Such boutique Malware are custom made to 
stay clear of deployed defenses rendering the latter ineffective.  
 
B.  Needs of Incident Responders 
 
Incident responders have a number of challenges to overcome when conducting Malware 
Remediation. Specifically covered in this paper, the challenge is on acquiring the needed 
competency. When a Malware successfully infiltrates pass the defenses and starts to induce 
risks  to  an  organization,  the  incident  responders  will  first  need  to  understand  how  the 
involved Malware works. According to Valli and Brand [10], the body of knowledge in the 
area  of Malware  analysis covers a  wide area of  topics  from  core  IT  subjects  to  forensic 
analysis, to knowledge in the use of a wide variety of IT tools such as administrative and 
forensic tools.  
When attempting to understand the Malware involved in an incident, incident responders 
need  to  identify  the  identity  of  the  Malware,  understand  its  corresponding  behavior  and 
subsequently define the appropriate remediation options. The number of possible Malware 
suspects to the incident is massive with many new ones being created daily. In McAfee’s third 
quarter’s threat report for 2011, it estimates that there will be 75 million Malware by the end 
2011 [11]. This poses a significant challenge to incident responders in attempting to identify 
the  Malware  involved  and  its  associated  remediation  options.  To  further  complicate  the 
situation, the analysis of Malware would likely to be done over infected computers and is less 
likely over the original source malicious file or material. When such information is not readily 
available, the incident responders will need to dig deeper into system like server logs to sift 
out useful information. Under such circumstance, the incident responders will need more 
skills  and  knowledge in the  setup  and  operations  of  the  IT infrastructure  environment  in 
which the Malware is roaming or spreading. Also, Malware is exploiting zero day exploits 
from a constant stream of unknown vulnerabilities in which, even at the time of incident, the 
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) of the software or appliance may not be aware of the 
existence of the vulnerability. Hence the incident responder may be required to isolate the 
exploit and to deal with the vulnerability in order to mitigate the further risks induced by the 
Malware.  
Experience  in  performing  Malware  Remediation  will  aid  in  the  management  of  risks 
associated with such cyber security incidents [12]. Experience in navigating through the IT 
operating environment and identifying ways to best leverage on the existing deployed security 
defenses, though they first failed to stop the Malware infiltration, may prove effective still in 
subsequent  containment  effort  of  the  Malware.  Additionally  prior  experience  in  handling 
Malware will enhance the responders’ ability to shorten the duration needed to defunct the 
Malware involved. While the number of Malware is growing at a rapid rate, most of the new 
Malware  are  variants  of  previous  versions  of  Malware  [26].  Hence,  prior  experience  in 
handling  Malware  will  help  the  incident  responders.  Finally,  experience  will  play  an 
important contributor to the relevance and usefulness of certain containment techniques for 
specific Malware or situational conditions.  
When incident responders lack such required competency, they will have difficulty in 
identifying an effective remediation plan. An ineffective remediation may cause more damage 
or induced more risks to the organization. There are Malware which can detect remediation 
attempts and they are able to launch an adverse counter offense against the organization. 
Malware have known to destroy data that they have control when they sense an attempt to 
contain  them  [13].  Additionally,  incompetent  incident  responders  may  likely  to  incur 
significantly more time to remediate the Malware problems. According to Verizon's report, 
Malware containment or remediation is taking a lot of time [14]. Infection occurs within 
seconds to minutes while containments last days to months. According to Logan and Logan 
[15], the remediation of Malware outbreak took 7 days before the computers were safe to be 
used again. As mentioned earlier, as the Malware gains and keeps control over important IT 
assets, the risk exposure escalates over time.    4 
What is required of incident responders is the ability to quickly identify a remediation 
solution that can effectively contain or defunct the Malware involved. However the current 
situation in the real world looks bleak. In order to address this limitation, it is believed that a 
form  of  knowledge  repository  is  required  to  be  established  with  a  comprehensive  set  of 
containment / remediation  techniques  that  can  be  leveraged  upon  quickly  to  improve  the 
outcome of remediation plans in terms of effectiveness to defunct the Malware and to reduce 
the duration in which the remediation plan is identified and applied. Therefore, a structure or 
format to store and represent such knowledge in a repository is first required. 
 
III.  RESEARCH PROPOSITION 
 
The research proposition in this paper is to establish a Malware Remediation pattern 
template to address the abovementioned problem. This  will enable the establishment of a 
knowledge repository for Malware Remediation that is to be developed in the future but not 
covered in this paper. Based on current research, it was found that such pattern template does 
not exist. The proposed Malware Remediation pattern template is based on security pattern 
template. Before going into the specifics of the proposed pattern template, some background 
information about pattern is provided below.  
 
A.  Patterns – Introduction 
  
Patterns may be defined as solutions to common occurring problems that occur within a 
specific  context.  Patterns  could  encapsulate  knowledge  and  understanding  as  regard  to  a 
particular  problem  hence  they  could  be  used  to  express  knowledge  from  experienced 
individuals or group of practitioners. According to May and Taylor [27], patterns can be used 
to  improve  the  process  of  converting  information  to  knowledge  as  part  of  knowledge 
management. Patterns may also be used to describe procedures and artefacts produced by 
processes  [16].  Good  patterns  are  like  cooking  recipes:  they  inform  what  elements  are 
required and they provide a sequence of step instructions or approaches on how to use the 
ingredients and the expected outcomes or products. Patterns could also include important 
contextual information like when the solutions are applicable and when they are not (also 
known  as  anti-patterns),  what  they  will  accomplish  and  how  to  adapt  them  to  specific 
situations. They will also state consequential effects when the actions are applied.  
Patterns are useful tools for solving multidisciplinary problems. In areas where there is a 
lack of skills or knowledge, patterns can help address the deficit by pre-packaging solutions to 
common  problems.  They  enable  reuse  of  successful  practices.  Patterns  could  be  used  to 
capture the experience from experts in a structured way [17]. Thus novices can benefit from 
the know-how and skills of people who have put much effort into the understanding of the 
contexts,  forces,  and  solutions.  Patterns  have  also  been  used  to  facilitate  teaching  by 
experienced teachers and to aid students’ learning. They are known as Pedagogical Patterns 
[18].  
 
B.  Malware Remediation Patterns – Research Proposition 
 
There are many forms of patterns that exist in academia and implementation practices. 
They include software design patterns that provide a knowledge repository of good software 
designs approaches. Security pattern is another example. Schumacher and Roedig [17] stated, 
“A security pattern describes a particular recurring security problem that arises in specific 
contexts and presents a well-proven generic scheme for its solution.” Hence, this proposition 
for a Malware Remediation pattern template derives from the concept of security pattern 
template. Details to justify this proposition will be covered in subsequent sections. 
 
IV.  RELATED WORK 
 
There is limited information or knowledge repository relating to Malware Remediation. 
On the other hand, most of the information has focused on Malware detection and security   5 
hardening solutions rather than remediation. The following evaluates the limitedly available 
information sources and their structure, other related forms of knowledge representation and a 
relevant pattern template. 
 
A.  Remediation Guide 
 
There are a number of guides provided by various organizations and individuals to aid 
incident responders in dealing with Malware outbreak. An example is the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology’s (NIST) “Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling” 
[12] and “Computer Security Incident Handling Guide” [19]. Other related computer security 
agencies or organizations have produced similar materials. Most of these guides proposed 
various approaches to contain a Malware outbreak. However, these guides lack a unified 
structure  in  the  way  information  is  organized.  In  some  cases,  they  lack  the  important 
information that is relevant to the incident, and what should have been considered prior to the 
application of the approaches. For example, considerations to the use of such approaches like 
prerequisites and consequential effects like the residual risks from the use of the approach are 
examples of omission. Also, they are short of cited examples to illustrate how the solution can 
be applied and links to related approaches. 
 
B.  Knowledge Management in IT Security  
 
Kesh and Ratnasingam [28] argued that knowledge management is an important tool that 
an organization can use to protect itself from hackers, Malware, theft of data and service 
disruption by providing security knowledge to the right people in the organization. They 
further argued that knowledge management practices should be applied to all stakeholders in 
the organization who are involved in the security management process. There are various 
attempts to structure security knowledge. Examples include the use of ontology [29] and 
patterns. There are attempts to cover different areas of security including software security 
[30]. However there is no knowledge management template for Malware Remediation. 
  
C.  Security Patterns 
 
Saltzer and Schroeder [20] introduced the concept of using design principles to improve 
the security of computer systems in their classic article, “The Protection of Information in 
Computer Systems.” Inadequate security in IT systems creates opportunities for exploitation. 
Security exploitation in IT may occur in the form of Malware outbreak induced by software 
vulnerabilities and weak mechanisms in protocols or software designs that are compromised 
through exploitation. Schumacher and Roedig [17] advocated that when deficiency exists in 
security  engineering  in  IT  solutions,  security  patterns  can  aid  in  addressing  this  gap. 
According  to  Kienzle  et  al.  [21],  “A  security  pattern  is  a  well-understood  solution  to  a 
recurring information security problem.” They are the concepts advocated by Christopher 
Alexander they were applied to the domain of information security. While some of such 
security patterns take the form of design patterns, not all security patterns are design patterns. 
Schumacher and Roedig argued that security patterns provide four significant benefits. 
First, patterns provide guided knowledge in security to non security experts. This is because 
security patterns capture the know-how and skills of security experts, thus enabling novices to 
act as security experts. The second benefit is that security professionals can exchange ideas 
and work on security issues effectively. This is because security patterns encompass both the 
security  problems  and  solutions.  They  limit  ad-hoc  solutions  as  patterns  are  defined  to 
represent proven solutions in a systematic and organized manner. The third benefit is that 
security patterns address security problems in structured approaches. Patterns explicitly cite 
qualifications and implications if any, so that an informed decision may be made before a 
particular pattern is applied. Finally, security patterns detail component dependencies and 
associations to other security patterns or issues. Such knowledge and illustrated examples are 
typically  acquired  through  experience.  When  security  patterns  are  linked  or  formally 
associated, changes that affect certain security patterns or problems will have impacts to other   6 
linked security patterns. Hence this would induce the need for refactoring of patterns to be 
done  regularly  to  ensure  that  the  security  patterns  are  relevantly  updated  in  the  face  of 
constant change.  
According to Heyman et al. [22], security patterns can be applied to many aspects of 
security from security assessment to security development lifecycle and security audits and 
recovery. However, there is no security pattern for Malware Remediation. Hence to address 
the problems faced by Malware incident responders, this paper advocates the establishment of 
the Malware Remediation pattern template. 
 
V.  METHODOLOGY 
 
This research proposition entails the use of security pattern template to represent Malware 
Remediation  pattern  template.  The  reasons  for  this  proposition  are  firstly  that  Malware 
Remediation is a form of IT security incident response to deal with a security risk when there 
is a Malware outbreak. Hence it relates to security. Secondly, security patterns have been used 
to  many  aspects  of  security  including  incident  response  and  disaster  recovery  in  which 
Malware outbreak or infection is a form of disaster that could become catastrophic. 
The following details a proposed Malware Remediation pattern template derived from a 
generic Security Pattern template advocated by Yoshioka et al [23]. The Pedagogical Patterns 
also uses the similar structure. 
 
•  Pattern Name: This is the primary key to the pattern. It should be self-explanatory and 
intuitive in order to improve communication and to facilitate search. 
•  Problem:  This  describes  the  Malware  incident  problem  that  may  be  solved  by  the 
application of the Malware Remediation pattern. 
•  Context:  Describes  the  context  in  which  the  problem  exists.  It  should  state  the 
environmental situation in which the pattern can be best used.  
•  Pre-requisite: This describes the properties that must be fulfilled prior to the start of the 
implementation of the pattern. It may entail environmental conditions or settings needed 
to support the pattern.  
•  Solution:  This  describes  the  specific  pattern  implementation  details.  It  may  include 
various forms of details depending on the context in which the pattern is applied. It may 
be qualitatively and quantitatively described. For example, for software designs, UML or 
pseudo codes may be used. 
•  Example: This provides an illustration or references on how the pattern solution may be 
or has been applied. 
•  Consequence: This provides details of likely residual risks or impact from the use of the 
pattern. This is important to ensure that the pattern user makes an informed decision prior 
to the use of the pattern and prepares the necessary to handle the consequences. 
•  Related Patterns or References: This provides references or linkages to materials used to 
produce this pattern or other patterns may be relevant or used in congruent to this pattern. 
 
These elements are required to provide details on why the pattern is relevant [Problem], 
where the pattern should apply [Context], when to apply [Pre-requisite], what is the impact 
after  its  application  [Consequence],  and  finally  how,  with  details,  is  the  pattern  applied 
[Solution]. The [Examples] and [References] provide relevant associations to other patterns or 
techniques. The followings are two examples of published techniques for containment by 
NIST mapped into the proposed Malware Remediation pattern template. Quotes are used 
when the exact text from the guide are included in the pattern draft. 
 
A.  Pattern 1 – Containment through Disabling Services 
 
The following Malware Remediation pattern is drafted using information from NIST’s 
“Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling” that advocated disabling services used 
by the Malware. The following is a pattern write-up for this. 
   7 
Pattern 
Element 
Pattern Details 
Name  Containment through Disabling Services 
 
Problem  Malware has infiltrated environment and managed to get pass deployed 
defenses with no detection and containment occurring from the latter. 
 
Context  Malware is exploiting specific network service(s) as part of its infection or 
attack vector. “An incident might generate so much network traffic or 
application activity, such as e-mails or file transfers that many applications 
could effectively be made unavailable.” 
 
Pre-
requisite 
a.  Able to identify which services that Malware is using for its infection or 
attack vectors 
b.  Identified service can be disabled as part of remediation. Business 
continuity plans may be required to mitigate the effects of service outage. 
 
Solution  “Containing such an incident quickly and effectively might be accomplished 
through a loss of services, such as shutting down a service used by malware, 
blocking a certain service at the network perimeter, or disabling portions of a 
service (e.g., large mailing lists)”. “Shutting down the affected services might 
be the best way to contain the infection without losing all services”. 
 
Depending on the situation and severity, network service outage in selected 
subnet instead of the entire network will aid in the remediating the effects of 
the Malware outbreak. The extent of the service outage is dependent on the 
characteristics of the Malware involved. 
 
Example  A response guide recommendation by NIST  
 
Con-
sequence 
“Disabling a service is generally a simple process; understanding the 
consequences of doing so tends to be more challenging” 
 
a.  Malware may adapt or update its strategy when it detects that its dependent 
network services are not available. 
b.  Malware may launch countermeasure offensive when it detects service 
unavailability. 
c.  “Disabling a service that the organization relies on has an obvious 
negative impact on the organization’s functions. Also, disabling a service 
might inadvertently disrupt other services that depend on it” 
“Organizations should maintain a list of dependencies between major 
services so that incident handlers are aware of them when making 
containment decisions. Also, organizations might find it helpful to provide 
alternative services with similar functionality”. 
d.  “Organizations should also be prepared to respond to problems caused by 
other organizations disabling their own services in response to a malware 
incident”. 
 
Related 
Patterns 
or 
Reference
s 
  Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling by NIST (Para. 4.3.4) 
  Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (Para. 3.3.4) 
 
Table 2. Containment through Disabling Services Pattern. 
   8 
B.  Pattern 2 – Containment through Disabling Connectivity 
 
The following containment pattern is drafted using NIST’s “Guide to Malware Incident 
Prevention and Handling” that advocated disabling connectivity used by the Malware. The 
following is a pattern write-up for this. 
 
Pattern 
Element 
Pattern Details 
Name  Containment through Disabling Connectivity  
 
Problem  Malware has infiltrated environment and managed to get pass deployed 
defenses with no detection and containment occurring from the latter. 
 
Context  Malware is using connectivity as part of its infection or attack vector. This may 
pose significant risks especially when the Malware is stealing data and sending 
data out through the network connectivity into the intended destination. 
 
Pre-
requisite 
a.  Able to identify which the connectivity route that Malware is using  
b.  “Organizations can design and implement their networks to make 
containment through loss of connectivity easier to do and less disruptive.” 
 
Solution  “Containing incidents by placing temporary restrictions on network 
connectivity”. “If infected systems within the organization attempt to spread 
their malware, the organization might block network traffic from the systems’ 
IP addresses to control the situation while the infected hosts are physically 
located and disinfected”. 
 
“An alternative to blocking network access for particular IP addresses is to 
disconnect the infected systems from the network, which could be accomplished 
by reconfiguring network devices to deny network access or physically 
disconnecting network cables or ejecting removable network interface cards 
from infected systems.” “The most drastic containment step is purposely 
breaking needed network connectivity for uninfected systems”. “In worst-case 
scenarios, isolating subnets from the primary network or even disconnecting 
the entire organization from the Internet might be necessary to stop the spread 
of malware, halt damage to systems, and provide an opportunity to mitigate 
vulnerabilities”. 
 
Example  A response guide recommendation by NIST  
 
Con-
sequence 
a.  Malware may adapt or update its strategy when it detects that its dependent 
network connectivity is not available. 
b.  Malware may launch countermeasure offensive when it detects 
connectivity unavailability. 
c.  Business or IT operations dependent on the connectivity will be affected. 
Hence contingency plans will need to invoke. 
 
Related 
Patterns 
or 
Reference
s 
  Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling by NIST (Para. 4.3.4) 
  Computer Security Incident Handling Guide (Para. 3.3.4) 
 
Table 3. Containment Through Disabling Connectivity Pattern. 
 
VI.  ANALYSIS   9 
 
The  mapping  exercise  from  NIST’s  guide  document  to  our  pattern  template  was 
seamlessly done as the NIST guide write-up was comprehensive and detailed. It is also shown 
that the proposed containment pattern template for incident responders is adequate enough to 
represent such forms of knowledge as the NIST’s guide was intended for such a purpose. The 
benefits that the proposed pattern offered above and beyond what is included in the NIST’s 
guide is the structure that imposes and linkages to other materials to enable fast adoption of 
knowledge and leverage on documented experience. Detailed steps of the remediation were 
not included in the NIST’s guide hence it was not included in the pattern drafts too. Future 
iterations of the patterns should include detailed steps to further simplify adoption. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Malware Remediation or containment is now recognized as the new line of defense for 
organizations and individuals who are constantly subjected to persistent onslaught of Malware 
attacks [61] that in turn affects business continuity of organizations. Incident responders, who 
are the defenders of this line of defense, are challenged by the ever advancing Malware. This 
paper  addressed  the  key  challenge  faced  by  incident  responders,  which  is  the  deep 
competency  requirements  of  knowledge,  skills  and  experience  to  aid  in  containing  the 
attacking Malware. To overcome this limitations, incident responders will need a repository 
of  Malware  Remediation  patterns  that  will  aid  them  to  shorten  the  learning  curve 
requirements  and  possibly  shorten  the  Malware  Remediation  duration.  Also,  when  the 
repository  is  timely  updated  with  new  threats  from  Malware,  the  Malware  Remediation 
competency will remain to be relevant. Our research proposition for a Malware Remediation 
pattern template is an important step towards establishing such a repository. In order for the 
pattern template and pattern knowledge repository to stay relevant, they should be maintained 
and updated by an open community of practitioners from the academia, security industry and 
security incident response practice. 
For future research directions, new containment patterns will be added to the repository. 
Also, patterns can be formally specified and verified. Patterns can also be coded using forms 
of  ontology  to  extend  this  knowledge  repository  to  integrate  with  other  knowledge 
repositories  like  Common  Vulnerabilities  and  Exposures  (CVE)  and  Malware  Attribute 
Enumeration and Characterization (MAEC) from Mitre [24]. It is believed that the use of such 
patterns will be a great help to security Incident Responders. 
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